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Abstract: In this paper, we evaluate the secrecy performance of multi-hop cognitive wireless sensor
networks (WSNs). In the secondary network, a source transmits its data to a destination via the
multi-hop relaying model using the transmit antenna selection (TAS)/selection combining (SC)
technique at each hop, in the presence of an eavesdropper who wants to receive the data illegally.
The secondary transmitters, including the source and intermediate relays, have to harvest energy from
radio-frequency signals of a power beacon for transmitting the source data. Moreover, their transmit
power must be adjusted to satisfy the quality of service (QoS) of the primary network. Under the joint
impact of hardware imperfection and interference constraint, expressions for the transmit power for
the secondary transmitters are derived. We also derive exact and asymptotic expressions of secrecy
outage probability (SOP) and probability of non-zero secrecy capacity (PNSC) for the proposed
protocol over Rayleigh fading channel. The derivations are then verified by Monte Carlo simulations.
Keywords: multi-hop wireless sensor networks; physical-layer security; transmit antenna selection;
selection combining; cognitive radio; energy harvesting; hardware impairments
1. Introduction
Security is one of the important issues in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) due to the broadcast
nature of wireless medium. Conventionally, encryption/decryption algorithms that generate
public/private keys are used to guarantee security [1,2]. Recently, a security framework for the
physical layer, called the wiretap channel or physical-layer security (PLS) [3–7], has been introduced as
a potential solution. In PLS, the difference between the channel capacity of the data link and the channel
capacity of the eavesdropping link, named secrecy capacity, is commonly used to evaluate secrecy
performance such as average secrecy capacity (ASC), secrecy outage probability (SOP), and probability
of non-zero secrecy capacity (PNSC). Hence, to enhance the secrecy performance, the quality of
the data and eavesdropping links should be increased and decreased, respectively. To enhance the
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channel capacity of the data links, diversity transmit and receive methods [8–10] can be used. In [8],
the transmit antenna selection (TAS) technique is employed at a multi-antenna base station (BS) to
maximize the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) obtained between BS and intended users.
References [9,10] considered MIMO secure communication systems, where the transmitter uses the TAS
technique, while the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper can use selection combining (SC) or maximal
ratio combining (MRC) for reception. In [11–15], cooperative relaying strategies were proposed to
improve secrecy performance via increasing the channel capacity for the data links. Moreover, to avoid
the eavesdropper combining the data with MRC, a randomize-and-forward (RF) strategy [16] can be
employed, where the source and relays generate different code-books to confuse the eavesdropper.
For significantly degrading the eavesdropping channels, cooperative jamming (CJ) methods were
reported in [17–19]. The basic idea of the CJ method is that jammer nodes are employed to generate
artificial noises on the eavesdropper. In addition, the legitimate receivers have to cooperate with the
jammers to remove the interference appeared in their received signals. However, the implementation
of this technique can be a difficult work due to the requirement of high synchronization between
the nodes.
Recently, wireless energy harvesting (EH) [20,21] has emerged as a potential solution to prolong
the lifetime of WSNs. In wireless EH, the energy-constrained devices can harvest energy from
radio frequency signals generated by ambient nodes. In [21], EH amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying
protocols were proposed and analyzed, where the relay node harvests energy from the source
for transmitting the source data to the destination. The authors of [22] considered both AF and
decode-and-forward (DF) relaying schemes employed a hybrid power splitting (PS) and time switching
(TS) EH relay. In [23–25], power beacons (PBs) are deployed in the networks to charge energy for
wireless devices. The PB-aided wireless power transfer models are suitable for large-scale WSNs or
wireless ad-hoc networks. Moreover, to avoid causing the co-channel interference to the receivers,
channels used for harvesting energy from the wireless signals of PBs are different from those used
for the data transmission. In [23–25], the authors studied the performance of secondary networks in
PB-assisted underlay cognitive radio (PB-UCR), where the transmit power of secondary users was
limited by both the harvested energy and the maximum interference levels required by primary users.
In [26], a secure communication scenario in cognitive sensor radio networks with an EH eavesdropper
was introduced. Reference [27] proposed various path-selection protocols in multi-path multi-hop
relaying networks in the presence of active eavesdroppers. Moreover, in [27], all of the terminals
whose transceiver hardware is low-cost suffered from hardware imperfection due to phase noise, I/Q
imbalance (IQI), amplifier nonlinearities, etc. [28–30].
This paper deals with multi-hop secure communication networks in PB-UCR under impact of
hardware impairments. In [31], the authors first evaluated the secrecy capacity in the presence of IQI
for OFDMA communication systems. Reference [32] proposed a secure massive MIMO system with
a passive multiple-antenna eavesdropper and hardware noises. The results in [31,32] showed that
the hardware impairments significantly impact of the secrecy performance. Next, unlike [27], our
scheme considers the PB-URC networks using the MIMO-based TAS/SC relaying technique. In [33–35],
cooperative multi-hop full-duplex relaying networks were proposed to enhance the end-to-end secrecy
performance. However, it is too difficult to apply these schemes into WSNs due to the complexity
of full-duplex operation. References [36–38] introduced simple multi-hop secure relaying scenarios
in which all of the nodes are equipped with a single antenna. In [39], PLS in downlink MIMO
multi-hop heterogeneous cellular networks were investigated. In particular, the data transmission
between base stations and mobile users is realized via direct or multi-hop mode. In [40], a multi-hop
multicasting secure transmission protocol with multi-antenna DF relays in the presence of multiple
eavesdroppers was proposed and analyzed. However, in [36–40], the authors did not consider the
cognitive environment as well as the wireless EH technique.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no published work related to multi-hop secure transmission
in PB-UCR under the impact of hardware noises. In the proposed protocol, a secondary source
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transmits its data to a secondary destination using the multi-hop mode in the presence of a secondary
eavesdropper. To support the reliable communication at each hop, the TAS/SC technique is used to
forward the source data. Operating on the underlay spectrum sharing method, the transmit power
of the secondary source and relay nodes must be adjusted to satisfy the required QoS of the primary
network. Moreover, the secondary transmitters have to harvest energy from PB deployed in the
secondary network for the data transmission. The main contribution of this paper can be summarized
as follows:
• We propose a simple multi-hop MIMO relaying protocol using the TAS/SC technique for PB-UCR
WSNs. The proposed protocol can obtain energy efficiency and spectrum usage efficiency, enhance
the reliability of data transmission, and improve the secrecy performance.
• In almost published works related to EH and UCR (see [23–25]), the transmitters adjust their
transmit power following the instantaneous channel state information. As a result, the transmit
power is a random variable (RV), which is not feasible. In this paper, the secondary source and
relay nodes are assumed to transmit the source data at fixed transmit power levels. In addition,
we derive an exact closed-form expression of the average transmit power of the secondary
transmitters under the joint impacts of the energy harvested, the interference constraint, and the
maximum transmit power level.
• We investigate the impact of hardware impairments on the end-to-end SOP and PNSC of the
proposed scheme. Indeed, the obtained results presented that the hardware imperfection has
a significant impact on the secrecy performance. Moreover, the analytical results showed that
different values of the hardware impairment levels of the data and eavesdropping links lead
to different secrecy performance trend. Finally, it is worth noting that the proposed scheme is
a generalized case of the existing schemes in which the transceiver hardware is assumed to be
perfect [11,41–43].
• We derive new exact and asymptotic expressions of the end-to-end SOP and PNSC over Rayleigh
fading channels, which are then verified by Monte Carlo simulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system model of the considered protocol is
described in Section 2. In Section 3, the expressions of SOP are derived. The simulation results are
shown in Section 4. Finally, this paper is concluded in Section 5.
2. System Model
Figure 1 illustrates the system model of the proposed scheme, in which a secondary source (T0)
wants to transmit its data to a destination (TK) via K− 1 intermediate nodes denoted by T1, T2, . . . ,
TK−1. The data transmission between T0 and TK is realized via K orthogonal time slots, exploiting
the TAS/SC technique. In particular, at the (k+ 1)-th hop, the node Tk selects an antenna to transmit
the source data to the node Tk+1, which uses the SC technique to combine the signals received from
Tk, where k = 0, 1, . . . ,K. We assume that all of the nodes including the source, the destination and
the relays are equipped with ND antennas. The transmitter Tk has to harvest energy from wireless
signals of a single-antenna power beacon (PB) deployed in the secondary network. Moreover, Tk must
adjust the transmit power to satisfy a maximal interference threshold (Ith) required by a single-antenna
primary user (PU). Also in the secondary network, there exists an NE-antenna eavesdropper (E) who
uses the SC technique to decode the source data obtained at each hop. Similar to [16], the secondary
transmitters randomly generate code-book to confuse the eavesdropper.
Comment 1: Due to the size limitation and complexity constraint, it is assumed that all of the
receivers can only use the SC combiner for decoding the data. In addition, the secrecy performance
of the proposed protocol is same with that of the corresponding one with multiple non-colluding
single-antenna eavesdroppers [44,45]. Finally, in the case where the eavesdropper can employ the
MRC technique, the expressions derived in this paper can be used as bound expressions of the
secrecy performance.
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Figure 1. System model of the proposed scheme.
Let us denote γX,Y as the channel gain of the link, where X, Y ∈ {Tk, E, PB, PU}. Assume
that all of the channels are Rayleigh fading; hence the channel gain γX,Y is an exponential RV.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) and probability density function (PDF) of γX,Y can be
expressed, respectively, as
FγX,Y (u) = 1− exp (−λX,Yu) , fγX,Y (u) = λX,Y exp (−λX,Yu) , (1)
where λX,Y is parameter of the exponential RV γX,Y, i.e., λX,Y = 1/E {γX,Y} = 1/
√
Var {γX,Y}, where E
is expected operator and Var {X} is variance of X. To take path-loss into account, we can model λX,Y
as λX,Y = d
β
X,Y [46], where dX,Y is the distance between X and Y, and β is the path-loss exponent.
We denote γTk,m ,Y as the channel gain between the m-th antenna of Tk and Y, where m =
1, 2, . . . , ND. Assume that RVs γTk,m ,Y are independent and identical, i.e., λTk,m ,Y = λTk ,Y for all m.
Also, let γX,Tk+1,n and γX,Ep as channel gain between X and the n-th antenna of Tk+1, and that between
X and the p-th antenna of E, respectively, where n = 1, 2, . . . , ND and p = 1, 2, . . . , NE. Similarly,
γX,Tk+1,n and γX,Ep are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) RVs, i.e., λX,Tk+1,n = λX,Tk+1 and
λX,Ep = λX,E for all n and p.
Let T denote the total transmission time between T0 and TK, and hence the time allocated for
each time slot is given as τ = T /K. Considering the (k+ 1)-th hop; a duration of ετ is used for Tk to
harvest energy, and the remaining duration, i.e., (1− ε) τ, is spent for the data transmission between
Tk and Tk+1, where 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1. Then, the amount of energy that TK can harvest is given by
EHk = ηετPB
ND
∑
v=1
γPB,Tk,v , (2)
where η (0 ≤ η ≤ 1) is energy conversion efficiency, and PB is transmit power of PB.
From (2), we can formulate the transmit power that Tk can use in the data transmission phase by
QEH,k =
EHk
(1− ε) τ = χPBϕsum,k, (3)
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where χ = ηε/ (1− ε) and ϕsum,k =
ND
∑
v=1
γPB,Tk,v . Using (Equation (A.7) [25]), we can write the CDF of
ϕsum,k as
Fϕsum,k (z) = 1−
ND−1
∑
t=0
1
t!
(
λPB,Tkz
)t exp (−λPB,Tkz) . (4)
Considering the data transmission between the transmitter A and the receiver B; under the
impact of the hardware impairments, the instantaneous SNR received at B can be expressed
as in [30,33,34,47,48]:
ΨA,B =
PAγA,B(
κ2A + κ
2
B
)
PAγA,B + σ2
=
PAγA,B
κ2A,BPAγA,B + σ
2
, (5)
where A, B ∈ {T, E, PB, PU}, PA is transmit power of the transmitter A, γA,B is channel gain between
A and B, σ2 is the variance of additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), κ2A and κ
2
B are constants
characterizing the level of the hardware impairments at A and B, respectively, and κ2A,B = κ
2
A + κ
2
B is
the total hardware impairment level. The values of κ2A, κ
2
B, κ
2
A,B, which depend on the structure of the
transceiver hardware at A and B, can be determined by practical experiments.
Moreover, in the URC network, if Tk uses the m-th antenna to transmit the data, the transmit
power must satisfy the interference constraint required by PU as in [25,49]:
QIN,k,m =
Ith(
1 + κ2P
)
γTk,m ,PU
, (6)
where κ2P is total hardware impairment level at Tk and PU (see [25,49]).
Let PS denote the maximum transmit power of each antenna; by combining (3) and (6),
the transmit power of the m-th antenna at Tk can be formulated by
Pk,m = min (QEH,k,QIN,k,m, PS) = PS min
(
µ1ϕsum,k,
µ2
γTk,m ,PU
, 1
)
=

PS min
(
µ1ϕsum,k,
µ2
γTk,m ,PU
)
, if min
(
µ1ϕsum,k,
µ2
γTk,m ,PU
)
< 1
PS, if min
(
µ1ϕsum,k,
µ2
γTk,m ,PU
)
≥ 1
(7)
where
µ1 =
χPB
PS
, µ2 =
Ith(
1 + κ2P
)
PS
.
We can observe from (7) that when min
(
µ1ϕsum,k, µ2/γTk,m ,PU
)
< 1, then Pk,m =
PS min
(
µ1ϕsum,k, µ2/γTk,m ,PU
)
is a RV, which is not feasible (although this assumption was widely
used in many published literature, e.g., [23–25] and references therein). In practice, the transmit power
Pk,m should be fixed at pre-determined levels. Indeed, assume that there are W + 1 fixed levels denoted
by Lv (v = 0, 1, . . . ,W) with Lv = vPS/W. For example, L0 = 0 is the lowest level, and LW = PS is the
highest one. Now, by combining with (7), we can write the expression of Pk,m as
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Pk,m =

0, if PS min
(
µ1ϕsum,k,
µ2
γTk,m ,PU
)
< L1
Lv, if v <W, Lv ≤ PS min
(
µ1ϕsum,k,
µ2
γTk,m ,PU
)
< Lv+1
LW , if LW ≤ PS min
(
µ1ϕsum,k,
µ2
γTk,m ,PU
) (8)
Now, we consider the data transmission between Tk and Tk+1. Employing the TAS/SC technique,
the transmit antenna at Tk and the receive antenna at Tk+1 are selected by the following strategy
(see [9]):
γTk,b ,Tk+1,c = maxm=1,2,...,ND
(
max
n=1,2,...,ND
(
γTk,m ,Tk+1,n
))
, (9)
where b and c are the selected antennas at Tk and Tk+1, respectively, b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ND} and c ∈
{1, 2, . . . , ND}. Since γTk,m ,Tk+1,n are i.i.d. RVs, CDF of γTk,b ,Tk+1,c can be obtained by
FγTk,b ,Tk+1,c (x) =
ND
∏
m=1
ND
∏
n=1
FγTk,m ,Tk+1,n (x) =
(
1− exp (−λTk ,Tk+1x))N2D
= 1 +
N2D
∑
v=1
(−1)v
(
N2D
v
)
exp
(−vλTk ,Tk+1x). (10)
With the presence of hardware impairments, the channel capacity of the Tk → Tk+1 link is
calculated as
CD,k = (1− ε) τlog2
(
1 +
Pk,bγTk,b ,Tk+1,c
κ2DPk,bγTk,b ,Tk+1,c + σ
2
)
, (11)
where κ2D is the total hardware impairment level at Tk and Tk+1, which is assumed to be the same for
all values of k.
Let us consider the eavesdropping link at the (k+ 1)-th hop; the channel capacity of the Tk → E
link can be obtained by
CE,k = (1− ε) τlog2
(
1 +
Pk,bγTk,b ,Eg
κ2EPk,bγTk,b ,Eg + σ
2
)
, (12)
where κ2E is the total hardware impairment level at Tk and E. In addition, since E uses the SC combiner,
the channel gain γTk,b ,Eg can be written as
γTk,b ,Eg = maxp=1,2,...,NE
(
γTk,b ,Ep
)
, (13)
where g ∈ {1, 2, . . . , NE}. In addition, CDF of γTk,b ,Eg can be expressed by
FγTk,b ,Eg (x) =
NE
∏
p=1
FγTk,b ,Ep (x) =
(
1− exp (−λTk ,Ex))NE . (14)
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From (14), we obtain PDF of γTk,b ,Eg as
fγTk,b ,Eg (x) = NEλTk ,E exp
(−λTk ,Ex) (1− exp (−λTk ,Ex))NE−1
=
NE−1
∑
u=0
(−1)u
(
NE − 1
u
)
NEλTk ,E exp
(− (u+ 1) λTk ,Ex) . (15)
Next, from (11) and (12), the secrecy capacity at the (k+ 1)-th hop is obtained by
CSec,k = max (0,CD,k − CE,k)
= max
(
0, (1− α) τ
[
log2
(
1 +
Pk,bγTk,b ,Tk+1,c
κ2DPk,bγTk,b ,Tk+1,c + σ
2
)
− log2
(
1 +
Pk,bγTk,b ,Eg
κ2EPk,bγTk,b ,Eg + σ
2
)])
. (16)
With the random-and-forward strategy, the end-to-end secrecy capacity of the proposed protocol
is given as in [37]:
Ce2eSec = mink=1,2,...,K
(CSec,k) . (17)
3. Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze the average transmit power of the secondary transmitters and the
secrecy performance of the proposed protocol in terms of SOP and PNSC.
3.1. Average Transmit Power of the Secondary Transmitters
From (8), the average transmit power of Tk can be given by the following formula:
E {Pk,b} = W−1∑
v=1
Pr
(
v
W
≤ min
(
µ1ϕsum,k,
µ2
γTk,b ,PU
)
<
v+ 1
W
)
v
W
PS
+ Pr
(
1 ≤ min
(
µ1ϕsum,k,
µ2
γTk,b ,PU
))
PS, (18)
where E {.} is an expectation operator. To calculate E {Pk,b}, we attempt to find CDF of
min
(
µ1ϕsum,k, µ2/γTk,b ,PU
)
. Setting Zmin,k = min
(
µ1ϕsum,k, µ2/γTk,b ,PU
)
, the CDF of Zmin,k is
obtained by
FZmin,k (z) = 1−
(
1− Fϕsum,k
(
z
µ1
))
FγTk,b ,PU
(µ2
z
)
. (19)
Substituting FγTk,b ,PU (x) = 1− exp
(−λTk ,PUx) and (4) into (19) yields
FZmin,k (z) = 1−
[
ND−1
∑
t=0
1
t!
(
λPB,Tk
z
µ1
)t
exp
(
−λPB,Tk
z
µ1
)](
1− exp
(
−λTk ,PUµ2
z
))
. (20)
Therefore, the average transmit power of Tk is written by
E
{
Pk,b
}
=
W−1
∑
v=1
(
FZmin,k
(
v+ 1
W
)
− FZmin,k
( v
W
)) v
W
PS +
(
1− FZmin,k (1)
)
PS. (21)
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3.2. Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP)
The end-to-end SOP of the proposed protocol can be calculated by
SOP = Pr(Ce2eSec<Cth) = Pr
(
min
k=1,2,...,K
(CSec,k) < Cth
)
= 1−
K
∏
k=1
(1− Pr (CSec,k < Cth))
= 1−
K
∏
k=1
(1− SOPk) , (22)
where Cth (Cth > 0) is a predetermined outage threshold, and SOPk = Pr (CSec,k < Cth) is the secrecy
outage probability at the k-th hop. Using (8) and (16), we can formulate SOPk by
SOPk =
W
∑
v=1
Pr (Pk,b = Lv)×Pr
1 +
LvγTk,b ,Tk+1,c
κ2DLvγTk,b ,Tk+1,c+σ
2
1 +
LvγTk,b ,Eg
κ2ELvγTk,b ,Eg+σ
2
< ρ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
SOPk(Lv)
, (23)
where ρ = 2Cth/(1−ε)τ .
It is noted from (23) that the secrecy outage event is only considered in the cases where the
transmit power Pk,b is higher than zero, i.e., Pk,b = Lv and v ≥ 1.
For the probability Pr (Pk,b = Lv) in (23), it can be calculated by
Pr (Pk,b = Lv) =
{
FZmin,k
(
v+1
W
)
− FZmin,k
( v
W
)
, if v <W
1− FZmin,k (1) , if v = W
(24)
Next, let us consider the SOP conditioned on Pk,b = Lv as marked in (23); we have
SOPk (Lv) = Pr
(
LvγTk,b ,Tk+1,c
κ2DLvγTk,b ,Tk+1,c + σ
2
< ρ− 1 + LvγTk,b ,Eg
κ2ELvγTk,b ,Eg + σ
2
ρ
)
= Pr
(
α0γTk,b ,Tk+1,c < α1,v + α2γTk,b ,Eg + α3,vγTk,b ,Tk+1,cγTk,b ,Eg
)
, (25)
where
α0 = 1− (ρ− 1) κ2D, α1,v =
σ2 (ρ− 1)
Lv
, α2 = (ρ− 1) κ2E + ρ,
α3,v =
Lv
σ2
(
(ρ− 1) κ2Dκ2E + κ2Dρ− κ2E
)
. (26)
We can observe from (25) that if α0 ≤ 0 (or κ2D ≥ 1/ (ρ− 1)), SOPk (Lv) always equals 1 for all
values of k and v.
In the following, we derive the exact expressions of SOPk (Lv) as given in Lemmas 1–3 below.
Lemma 1. When α0 > 0 and α3,v > 0
(
or κ2D > κ
2
E/
(
ρ+ (ρ− 1) κ2E
))
, the exact expression of SOP can be
given as
SOPk (Lv) = 1 +
N2D
∑
n=1
NE−1
∑
m=0
(−1)n+mβ0
∫ α0
0
exp (β1y) exp
(
− β2
y
)
dy. (27)
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Proof. At first, when α0 > 0 and α3,v > 0, we can rewrite SOPk (Lv) as
SOPk (Lv) = Pr
((
α0 − α3,vγTk,b ,Eg
)
γTk,b ,Tk+1,c < α1,v + α2γTk,b ,Eg
)
= Pr
(
γTk,b ,Eg ≥
α0
α3,v
)
+ Pr
(
γTk,b ,Eg <
α0
α3,v
,γTk,b ,Tk+1,c <
α1,v + α2γTk,b ,Eg
α0 − α3,vγTk,b ,Eg
)
= 1− FγTk,b ,Eg
(
α0
α3,v
)
+
∫ α0/α3,v
0
FγTk,b ,Tk+1,c
(
α1,v + α2x
α0 − α3,vx
)
fγTk,b ,Eg (x) dx. (28)
By substituting the CDF of γTk,b ,Tk+1,c in (10), and the PDF of γTk,b ,Eg in (15) into (28), after some
manipulations, we arrive at
SOPk (Lv) = 1 +
N2D
∑
n=1
NE−1
∑
m=0
(−1)n+m
(
N2D
n
)(
NE − 1
m
)
NEλTk ,E
×
∫ α0/α3,v
0
exp
(− (m+ 1) λTk ,Ex) exp(−nλTk ,Tk+1 α1,v + α2xα0 − α3,vx
)
dx. (29)
By changing variable y = α0 − α3,vx, we have
SOPk (Lv) = 1+
N2D
∑
n=1
NE−1
∑
m=0
(−1)n+m
(
N2D
n
)(
NE − 1
m
)
NEλTk ,E
α3,v
× exp
(
nλTk ,Tk+1
α2
α3,v
− (m+ 1) λTk ,E
α0
α3,v
)
×
∫ α0
0
exp
(
(m+ 1) λTk ,E
α3,v
y
)
exp
(
−nλTk ,Tk+1
α1,vα3,v + α0α2
α3,vy
)
dy. (30)
With α1,vα3,v + α0α2 = ρ, we can rewrite (30) as
SOPk (Lv) = 1 +
N2D
∑
n=1
NE−1
∑
m=0
(−1)n+mβ0
∫ α0
0
exp (β1y) exp
(
− β2
y
)
dy. (31)
where
β0 =
(
N2D
n
)(
NE − 1
m
)
NEλTk ,E
α3,v
exp
(nλTk ,Tk+1α2 − (m+ 1) λTk ,Eα0
α3,v
)
,
β1 =
(m+ 1) λTk ,E
α3,v
, β2 =
nλTk ,Tk+1ρ
α3,v
. (32)
We finish the proof of Lemma 1 here. We note that the integrals in (27) can be easily calculated by
computer software such as Matlab or Mathematica.
Comment 2: We can observe from (27) that the exact expression of SOPk (Lv) is still in integral
form, which does not provide any insights into the system performance. Therefore, our next objective
is to find an asymptotic expression at high transmit SNR as given in Corollary 1 below.
Corollary 1. When α0 > 0 and α3,v > 0, we can approximate SOPk (Lv) at high transmit SNR(
PS/σ2 → +∞
)
by a closed-form expression as
SOPk (Lv)
PS/σ2→+∞≈ 1−
(
1− exp
(
−λTk ,E
α0
α3,v
))NE
. (33)
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Proof. At high transmit SNR, we can approximate (25) in this case as follows:
SOPk (Lv) = Pr
(
α0γTk,b ,Tk+1,c < α1,v + α2γTk,b ,Eg + α3,vγTk,b ,Tk+1,cγTk,b ,Eg
)
PS/σ2→+∞≈ Pr
(
α0γTk,b ,Tk+1,c < α3,vγTk,b ,Tk+1,cγTk,b ,Eg
)
= Pr
(
γTk,b ,Eg >
α0
α3,v
)
PS/σ2→+∞≈ 1− FγTk,b ,Eg
(
α0
α3,v
)
. (34)
Substituting (14) into (34), we obtain (33).
Comment 3: Combining (22), (23), (27), and (33), we obtain exact and asymptotic formulas of the
end-to-end SOP when α0 > 0 and α3,v > 0. Equation (33) implies that SOPk (Lv) at high transmit SNR
only depends on λTk ,E, α0, and α3,v. Moreover, SOPk (Lv) (and the end-to-end SOP) increases when
PS/σ2 increases.
Lemma 2. When α0 > 0 and α3,v < 0, an exact expression of SOPk (Lv) can be given as
SOPk (Lv) = 1 +
N2D
∑
n=1
NE−1
∑
m=0
(−1)n+m+1β0
∫ +∞
α0
exp (β1y) exp
(
− β2
y
)
dy. (35)
Proof. Similar to (28), SOPk (Lv) in this case can be written by
SOPk (Lv) = Pr
((
α0 − α3,vγTk,b ,Eg
)
γTk,b ,Tk+1,c < α1,v + α2γTk,b ,Eg
)
= Pr
(
γTk,b ,Tk+1,c <
α1,v + α2γTk,b ,Eg
α0 − α3,vγTk,b ,Eg
)
=
∫ +∞
0
FγTk,b ,Tk+1,c
(
α1,v + α2x
α0 − α3,vx
)
fγTk,b ,Eg (x) dx. (36)
With the same manner as deriving SOPk (Lv) in (28), we can obtain (35).
Corollary 2. At high transmit SNR, SOPk (Lv) in (35) can be approximated by
SOPk (Lv)
PS/σ2→+∞≈
(
1− exp
(
λTk ,Tk+1
α2
α3,v
))N2D
. (37)
Proof. Similar to the proof of Corollary 1, we have
SOPk (Lv) = Pr
(
α0γTk,b ,Tk+1,c < α1,v + α2γTk,b ,Eg + α3,vγTk,b ,Tk+1,cγTk,b ,Eg
)
PS/σ2→+∞≈ Pr
(
−α3,vγTk,b ,Tk+1,cγTk,b ,Eg < α2γTk,b ,Eg
)
PS/σ2→+∞≈ FγTk,b ,Tk+1,c
(
− α2
α3,v
)
. (38)
Substituting (10) into (38), we then obtain (37).
Comment 4: Combining (22), (23), (35), and (37), we obtain exact and asymptotic expressions of
the end-to-end SOP when α0 > 0 and α3,v < 0. Equation (37) also shows that at high transmit SNR,
SOPk (Lv) (and the end-to-end SOP) decreases as PS/σ2 increases.
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Lemma 3. When α0 > 0 and α3,v = 0, SOPk (Lv) is given by an exact closed-form expression as
SOPk (Lv) =1+
N2D
∑
n=1
NE−1
∑
m=0
(−1)n+m
(
N2D
n
)(
NE − 1
m
)
NEλTk ,E
(m+ 1) λTk ,E + nλTk ,Tk+1α2/α0
exp
(
−nλTk ,Tk+1
α1,v
α0
)
. (39)
Proof. In this case, we have
SOPk (Lv) = Pr
(
α0γTk,b ,Tk+1,c < α1,v + α2γTk,b ,Eg
)
=
∫ +∞
0
FγTk,b ,Tk+1,c
(
α1,v
α0
+
α2
α0
x
)
fγTk,b ,Eg (x) dx. (40)
Substituting CDF of γTk,b ,Tk+1,c in (10), and PDF of γTk,b ,Eg in (15) into (40), after some
manipulations, we can obtain (39), and finish the proof.
Corollary 3. When α0 > 0 and α3 = 0, SOPk (Lv) can be approximated by
SOPk (Lv)
PS/σ2→+∞≈ 1 +
N2D
∑
n=1
NE−1
∑
m=0
(−1)n+m
(
N2D
n
)(
NE − 1
m
)
NEλTk ,E
(m+ 1) λTk ,E + nλTk ,Tk+1α2/α0
. (41)
Proof. In this case, we have the following approximation:
SOPk (Lv) = Pr
(
α0γTk,b ,Tk+1,c < α1,v + α2γTk,b ,Eg
)
PS/σ2→+∞≈ Pr
(
α0γTk,b ,Tk+1,c < α2γTk,b ,Eg
)
PS/σ2→+∞≈
∫ +∞
0
FγTk,b ,Tk+1,c
(
α2
α0
x
)
fγTk,b ,Eg (x) dx. (42)
Substituting CDF of γTk,b ,Tk+1,c , and PDF of γTk,b ,Eg into (42), after some manipulations,
we can obtain (41).
Comment 5: Equation (41) shows that SOPk (Lv), as well as the end-to-end SOP at high transmit
SNR, do not depend on PS/σ2. It is worth noting that this paper considers a generalized system model
where the hardware impairment levels on the data links and eavesdropping links can be different
or the same. Moreover, we can observe from Lemmas 1–3 that the secrecy outage probability of the
proposed protocol is only expressed by an exact closed-form formula when α3 = 0.
3.3. Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity (PNSC)
In this subsection, we analyze the end-to-end PNSC of the proposed protocol, which can be
formulated by
PNSC = Pr(Ce2eSec> 0) = Pr
(
min
k=1,2,...,K
(CSec,k) > 0
)
=
K
∏
k=1
Pr (CSec,k > 0)
=
K
∏
k=1
PNSCk, (43)
where PNSCk = Pr (CSec,k > 0) is the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity at the k-th hop.
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Lemma 4. The exact expressions of PNSCk can be given by
PNSCk =
M
∑
v=1
Pr (Pk,b = Lv)
×

N2D
∑
n=1
NE−1
∑
m=0
(−1)n+m+1χ0
∫ 1
0 exp (χ1y) exp
(
− χ2y
)
dy, if κ2D > κ
2
E
N2D
∑
n=1
NE−1
∑
m=0
(−1)n+m+1χ0
∫ +∞
1 exp (χ1y) exp
(
− χ2y
)
dy, if κ2D < κ
2
E
N2D
∑
n=1
N−1
∑
m=0
(−1)n+m
(
N2D
n
)(
NE − 1
m
)
NEλTk ,E
(m+1)λTk ,E+nλTk ,Tk+1
, if κ2D = κ
2
E
(44)
where Pr (Pk,b = Lv) is calculated as in (24), and
χ0 =
(
N2D
n
)(
NE − 1
m
)
NEλTk ,Eσ
2
Lv
(
κ2D − κ2E
) exp((nλTk ,Tk+1 − (m+ 1) λTk ,E) σ2
Lv
(
κ2D − κ2E
) ) ,
χ1 =
(m+ 1) λTk ,Eσ
2
Lv
(
κ2D − κ2E
) ,χ2 = nλTk ,Tk+1σ2Lv (κ2D − κ2E) . (45)
Proof. Similar to (23), we can formulate PNSCk as
PNSCk =
M
∑
v=1
Pr (Pk,b = Lv)×Pr
1 +
LvγTk,b ,Tk+1,c
κ2DLvγTk,b ,Tk+1,c+σ
2
1 +
LvγTk,b ,Eg
κ2ELvγTk,b ,Eg+σ
2
> 1

=
M
∑
v=1
Pr (Pk,b = Lv)×
[
1− lim
ρ→1
(SOPk (Lv))
]
. (46)
Next, by substituting ρ = 1, α0 = 1, α1,v = 0, α2 = 1 into α3,v = Lv
(
κ2D − κ2E
)
/σ2 in (27), (35),
and (39), we can obtain (45).
Comment 6: Similar to [37], the end-to-end PNSC can be obtained with three different cases, i.e.,
κ2D > κ
2
E, κ
2
D < κ
2
E, and κ
2
D = κ
2
E. Moreover, when κ
2
D = κ
2
E, we obtain the exact closed-form expression
of the end-to-end PNSC. Finally, with κ2D = κ
2
E, the end-to-end PNSC value does not depend on the
transmit SNR as well as the hardware impairment levels.
4. Simulation Results
In this section, we present Monte Carlo simulations to verify the theoretical results obtained in
Section 3 by using MATLAB 2014a. For Monte Carlo experiments, we perform 105–5 ∗ 106 independent
trials, and in each trial, the Rayleigh channel coefficients for all of the links are generated to obtain the
end-to-end secrecy performance. For the theoretical results, the expressions derived in Section 3 are
used to present them.
In the simulation environment, a two-dimensional Oxy plane is considered, where the primary
user (PU), the power beacon (PB), the secondary eavesdropper (E), and the secondary node (Tk) are
located at (xP, yP), (xB, yB), (xE, yE), and (k/K, 0), respectively, where k = 0, 1, . . . ,K. In all of the
simulations, we fix the path-loss exponent (β) by 3, the number of transmit power levels (W) by 8,
the variance of Gaussian noises
(
σ2
)
by 1, and the block time (T ) by 1. Moreover, we assume that
PB = 2PS = 4Ith, and the total hardware impairment level κ2P equals 0. It is noted from figures that
simulation results (Sim) are presented by markers, while the theoretical results including exact ones
(Exact) and asymptotic ones (Asym) are presented by solid and dash lines, respectively.
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In Figure 2, we present the average transmit power of the secondary transmitters as a function of
PS. In this simulation, the number of hops (K) is 3, the number of antennas at the node Tk (ND) equals 3,
the energy conversion efficiency (η) by 0.25, and the fraction of time spent for the EH phase (ε) is 0.25.
In addition, the co-ordinates of PB and PU are (0.4, 0.3) and (0.6, −0.5), respectively. We can observe
from Figure 2 that the average transmit power of the source (T0) is highest because the Euclidean
distance between T0 and PU is farthest. We also see that the average transmit power of T0, T1, and T2
linearly increases as PS increases. It is worth noting that the simulation results match very well with
the theoretical ones, which validates our derivations.
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Figure 2. Average transmit power of the secondary transmitters as a function of PS when K = 3,
ND = 3, ε = 0.25, η = 0.25, xB = 0.4, yB = 0.3, xP = 0.6, and yP = −0.5.
Figure 3 investigates the impact of the positions of PU and PB on the average transmit power
of the secondary transmitters. Particularly, we change xB from 0.1 to 0.9, and xP is calculated by
xP = 1− xB. Moreover, we fix the values of yB and yP by 0.3 and –0.5, respectively. It can be seen from
Figure 3 that the average transmit power of T0, T1, and T2 varies with different positions of PB and
PU. For example, when xB = 0.1, the positions of PB and PU are (0.1, 0.3) and (0.9, –0.5), respectively.
In this case, the average transmit power of T2 is lowest because this node is nearest to PU. For another
example, xB = 0.5, the distances between T1 and PU, and between T2 and PU are the same, and hence
the average transmit power of T1 and T2 is almost the same. For the nodes T1 and T2, we see that there
exist positions of PB and PU at which their average transmit power is lowest. However, the average
transmit power of T0 always decreases as xB increases.
Figure 4 presents the end-to-end SOP as a function of PS with different number of antennas at E.
In this simulation, the total hardware impairment levels of the data and eavesdropping links are given
as κ2D = 0.01 and κ
2
E = 0, respectively, and hence the conditions in Lemma 1 are satisfied, i.e., α0 > 0
and α3,v > 0. It can be seen from this figure that simulation results match very well with theoretical
ones. Moreover, we see that the exact end-to-end SOP converges to the approximate one at high PS
values, which verifies the derived expressions obtained in Lemma 1 and Corollary 1. As proved in
Corollary 1, the end-to-end SOP at high PS regime increases with the increasing of PS. In addition,
Figure 4 shows that there exists an optimal value of PS at which the SOP value is lowest. Finally,
we can see that the secrecy performance of the proposed protocol is worse with higher number of
antennas at E.
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Figure 3. Average transmit power of the secondary transmitters as a function of xB when PS = 10 dB,
K = 3, ND = 3, ε = 0.25, η = 0.25, yB = 0.3, xP = 1− xB, and yP = −0.5.
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Figure 4. End-to-end secrecy outage probability as a function of PS when K = 3, ND = 2, ε = 0.25,
η = 0.25, Cth = 0.2, xB = 0.5, yB = 0.3, xP = 0.5, yP = −0.5, xE = 0.5, yE = 0.5, κ2D = 0.01, and κ2E = 0.
In Figure 5, we present the end-to-end SOP as a function of PS with various number of hops
(K). In this figure, we assume that the transceiver hardware of the authorized nodes is better than
that of the eavesdropper, i.e., κ2D = 0 and κ
2
E = 0.01, which satisfy the conditions in Lemma 2, i.e.,
α0 > 0 and α3,v < 0. It is seen from Figure 5 that the end-to-end SOP rapidly decreases as PS increases.
Moreover, the secrecy performance significantly enhances with higher number of hops. Finally,
the simulation results again validate the theoretical results obtained from Lemma 2 and Corollary 2.
In Figure 6, we consider the cases where α3,v = 0 or (ρ− 1) κ2Dκ2E + κ2Dρ− κ2E = 0. As proved in
Lemma 3 and Corollary 3, we can see from Figure 6 that the exact end-to-end SOP rapidly converges
to the asymptotic one which does not depend on PS. It is also seen that the hardware impairment
levels κ2D and κ
2
E significantly impact on the secrecy performance. In this figure, the value of SOP is
lowest when the transceiver hardware of the authorized nodes and the eavesdropper is perfect, i.e.,
κ2D = κ
2
E = 0.
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Figure 5. End-to-end secrecy outage probability as a function of PS when ND = 2, NE = 2, ε = 0.25,
η = 0.25, Cth = 0.2, xB = 0.5, yB = 0.3, xP = 0.5, yP = −0.5, xE = 0.5, yE = 0.5, κ2D = 0, and κ2E = 0.01.
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Figure 6. End-to-end secrecy outage probability as a function of PS when K = 3, ND = 2, NE = 2,
ε = 0.25, η = 0.25, Cth = 0.25, xB = 0.5, yB = 0.3, xP = 0.5, yP = −0.5, xE = 0.5, and yE = 0.5.
Figure 7 presents the SOP performance of the proposed protocol as a function of the fraction of
time spent for the EH process (ε). As illustrated in this figure, the end-to-end SOP increases with higher
value of ε. Moreover, when ε is very small, the probability Pr (Pk,b = Lv) in (23) (v ≥ 1) converges to
zero, and hence the end-to-end SOP also goes to zero. Next, similar to Figure 5, the secrecy performance
significantly enhances when the hardware impairment level of the data links
(
κ2D
)
is lower than that of
the eavesdropping links
(
κ2E
)
.
In Figure 8, we investigate the impact of the number of hops (K) on the end-to-end SOP. In this
simulation, we assume that the number of antennas at the Tk and E nodes is same, i.e., ND = NE,
and the transceiver hardware of these nodes is perfect, i.e., κ2D = κ
2
E = 0. As we can see, the values
of SOP almost decrease as increasing the number of hops. However, in the case that ND = NE = 1,
the end-to-end SOP is highest when the number of hops equals 2. When K ≥ 2, it is seen that the
SOP performance in case that ND = NE = 3 is best. Moreover, the value of SOP in this case rapidly
decreases with the increasing of K.
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Figure 7. End-to-end secrecy outage probability as a function of ε when PS = 10 dB, K = 4, ND = 2,
NE = 2, η = 0.1, Cth = 0.25, xB = 0.5, yB = 0.3, xP = 0.5, yP = −0.5, xE = 0.5, and yE = 0.5.
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Figure 8. End-to-end secrecy outage probability as a function of K when PS = 0 dB, ε = 0.1, η = 0.1,
Cth = 0.25, xB = 0.5, yB = 0.3, xP = 0.5, yP = −0.5, xE = 0.5, yE = 0.5, κ2D = 0, and κ2E = 0.
In Figure 9, we present the end-to-end PNSC as a function of PS with various values of κ2D as κ
2
E
is fixed by 0.05. As observed, the PNSC performance is better with the decreasing of κ2D. Moreover,
as κ2D < κ
2
E
(
κ2D > κ
2
E
)
, the value of PNSC increases (decreases) with higher value of PS, and in the case
that κ2D = κ
2
E, this value does not depend on PS. It is worth noting that the simulation and theoretical
results match very well with each other, which validates the formulas derived in Lemma 4.
Figure 10 presents the end-to-end PNSC as a function of κ2D with different number of hops (K).
As shown in this figure, the PNSC performance significantly decreases when the hardware impairment
level of the data link increases. Moreover, at high κ2D values, the end-to-end PNSC is worse with high
number of hops.
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Figure 9. End-to-end probability of non-zero secrecy capacity as a function of PS when K = 3, ε = 0.25,
η = 0.25, xB = 0.5, yB = 0.3, xP = 0.5, yP = −0.5, xE = 0.5, yE = 0.5, κ2E = 0.05, ND = 1, and NE = 2.
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Figure 10. End-to-end probability of non-zero secrecy capacity as a function of κ2D when K = 3, ε = 0.1,
η = 0.25, xB = 0.5, yB = 0.3, xP = 0.5, yP = −0.5, xE = 0.5, yE = 0.5, κ2E = 0.2, ND = 2, and NE = 2.
5. Conclusions
This paper proposed and evaluated the secrecy performance of the TAS/SC-based multi-hop
harvest-to-transmit cognitive WSNs under the joint impact of the interference constraint,
the limited-energy source, and the hardware impairments. The main contribution of this paper is
to derive new exact and asymptotic expressions of the end-to-end SOP and PNSC over Rayleigh
fading channel, which can be used to design and optimize the performance of the considered
networks, with any hardware impairment levels, as well as other system parameters, in the practical
considerations. The interesting results obtained in this paper can be listed as follows:
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• The hardware impairments have a significant impact on the secrecy performance. Particularly,
when the transceiver hardware of the authorized nodes is better than that of the eavesdropper,
the proposed protocol obtains high secrecy performance. Otherwise, the SOP and PNSC
performance is significantly degraded.
• The secrecy performance of the proposed protocol can be enhanced with higher number of
antennas equipped at the authorized nodes.
• By optimally designing the number of hops and the fraction of time spent for the energy harvesting
phase, the secrecy performance of the proposed protocol can be significantly improved.
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